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It has been claimed that the United States is bearing a
disproportionate share of the burden of the alliance system
in which it is involved. In this thesis, two prominent con-
cepts used for explaining military alliances, balance of
power and the theory of collective goods , were studied to
determine if they provide precise answers on the subject of
burden-sharing. It was concluded that the balance of power
philosophy is far too subjective to provide any precise
answer. On the other hand, the theory of collective goods,
as authored by Olson and Zeckhauser, yields the conclusion
that a positive correlation exists between the size of a
country's income and the size of its contribution to the
alliance. However, their conclusion holds only when the
alliance is in equilibrium and when their other assumptions
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PURPOSE
The United States is currently a member of eight bilateral
or multilateral mutual security treaties or alliances (See
Appendix A). These alliances, the product of American foreign
policy in the post-World War II era, have been the subject of
much debate in recent years. A major question arising from
these debates concerns the subject of burden-sharing by the
members of these alliances. Stated more precisely, is the
United States bearing a disproportionate share of the burden
of its alliance system? In relation to the European members
of NATO, for example, one analyst of American foreign policy
has stated:
"Two decades after a war from which they have long since
recovered economically, they show few signs of fulfilling
the original post-war expectation that they would assume
the major burden of their own defense in return for an
American guarantee. "^
The debates on the question of burden-sharing have been
quite subjective in nature and, as a result, have not led to
any precise answer. The purpose of this paper is to address
the problem of economic burden-sharing in alliances to deter-
mine if a precise answer can be found. Two prominent concepts
for explaining the "raison d'entre" of alliances, balance of
power and the theory of collective goods, will be studied to
Russett, Bruce M. , What Price Vigilance? The Burdens
of National Defense, p. 92, Yale University Press, 1970.

determine if they provide the quantitative analysis necessary
for the precison desired.
The study is organized in the following manner. The
remainder of Chapter I addresses the origin of the alliance
system and the reasons for questioning its necessity today.
Chapter II contains a discussion on the role of alliances
and commitments in international politics. The concept of
balance of power is presented in Chapter III and the theory
of collective goods in Chapter IV. Chapter V contains the
conclusions.
In summary, this paper will show that the balance of
power concept is not suited to quantitative analysis due to
its subjective nature. The theory of collective goods lends
itself to quantitative analysis and does answer the question




Following World War II, the Soviet Union under Stalin
challenged the independence and security of the free world.
Communism had spread to China. Eastern Europe was effectively
under the control of the Soviet Union. Soviet troops had
occupied Iran for a period of time. Pressure was applied on
Turkey to concede the straits to the Aegean Sea to Russia.
Communist inspired civil war had resumed in Greece. Berlin was

2blockaded in 1948, and Korea was invaded in 1950. These
events precipitated the opinion within the United States
that its primary goal of foreign policy must be the contain-
ment of the expansionist movement by the Soviet Union and
3
other countries. This foreign policy, and its military
counterpart, the strategy of deterrence, which was based on
the exploitation of a superior nuclear technology, became
manifest in four parts:
1) A system of bilateral and multilateral military
alliances which began in 194 7 and continued through 1954
and which included most of the noncommunist countries of
Europe and Asia, as well as Latin America (See Appendix A)
;
2) the overseas deployment of American military forces
to strengthen the position of America's allies and to re-
flect the seriousness of its intentions to all adversaries;
3) the: maintenance of much larger and more diversified
military forces, including nuclear capabilities, than ever
before by the United States during peacetime; and
4) the achievement of much higher levels of combat
readiness by United States forces than had been accepted
4
under previous mobilization strategies.
This policy was considered technically correct in that
it enabled the United States to avoid the use of military
2 Huntington, Samuel P. , "After Containment: The Functions
of the Military Establishment", American Academy of Political
and Social Sciences . The Annals , v. 406, p. 2-3, March 1973.
3 Ibid
- / p - 3 -
4 Ibid.

force to achieve some diplomatic or political goal. In
essence, the goal of containment was served by the means of
a deterrence achieved by alliances and armaments. At the
time this policy was formed and for several years thereafter,
the United States had sufficient means to implement it. The
American economy was over twice the size of the Soviet
economy. The distinct nuclear advantage the United States
enjoyed virtually eliminated the possibility of a first strike
by the Soviet Union. Also, the American air and naval power
made it possible to deploy military forces anywhere in the
world quite rapidly. Finally, the United States enjoyed
7political and economic hegemony in the non-communist world.
The rest of the nations of this alliance system, having
been economically weakened by World War II , or in an under-
developed state, were forced to allocate their resources to
internal development. They were not able to grow economically
and improve their defense capability concurrently. In this
environment, United States' military expenditures for their
protection were believed to be consistent with its role in the
free world.
2. The Changing World Environment
Although the United States remains the strongest







last two decades. This change has been generated by four
major factors, and it has resulted in a relative decline in
g
American power. These factors are:
1) The rise of Soviet military power resulting in
strategic parity with the United States;
2) the rise of regionally dominant powers such as
Brazil in Latin America, Israel in the Middle East, and
North Vietnam in Indochina, which have replaced American
influence in those areas;
3) the disaffection with militarism which now seems to
dominate the American scene; and
9
4) the rise of Japanese, Arab, and European economies.
A discussion of these factors will show why this relative
decline has occurred.
The rise of regional powers and the attainment of strate-
gic parity, especially in terms of nuclear warhead delivery
systems, by the Soviet Union have virtually destroyed the
territorial concept of security reflected by containment and
deterrence policies. It can be argued, and the isolationists
do, that in view of this, alliances are unnecessary and reflect







Tucker, Robert W. , A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise? ,
p. 22, Universe Books, 197TI




American involvement in Southeast Asia is one consequence
of reliance upon a containment policy. The costs of that in-
volvement have not been fully assessed and may not for several
years. However, it seems apparent that public opinion is now
very much against future Vietnam-type military interventions
and the subsequent burden in dollars and lives. The recent
congressional action on the use of American military aircraft
in Cambodia typifies this opinion.
Although the United States still has the largest GNP in
the world, it no longer dominates the world economically.
Japan, Europe and the Arab oil states are now major economic
forces and must be treated accordingly. In the period 1961 to
1970, the United States realized a percentage increase in its
GNP of 87.3. In contrast, the percentage increase for Japan
was 271.0 during the same period. Also, of the European
members of NATO, only the United Kingdom and Turkey have not
realized a percentage increase in GNP greater than the United
States.
These four factors reveal that some nations of the world
are decreasing the difference militarily and economically
between themselves and the United States. The result is a
relative decline in American power. The economic impact of
these factors, however, is more relevant to this study,
because it is from this that the problem of burden-sharing
in the American alliance system arises.
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(USACDA) , World Military Expenditures , 1971, p. 22-23, 1972
11

As mentioned previously, one purpose the United States
had in forming its alliance system was to provide an umbrella
of deterrence under which the less developed members could
concentrate their resources on economic growth instead of
defense. That economic growth has occurred. However, these
countries were expected to make investments for their own
defense, thus augmenting the deterrence capability of the
alliances, concurrent with their economic growth. A conflict
of goals ensued. The United States could not expect its
allies to make investments in their own economic growth and
provide their resources for augmenting the alliance
12
simultaneously. This conflict was resolved by the allies
to their advantage. The economic growth rates surpass that of
the United States in many instances, but the same is not
true for the percentage increase in military expenditures.
In several instances, the percentage change in military
expenditures does not surpass that of the United States.
This situation lends substance to the arguments of those
Americans opposed. to the alliance system. They see allies
growing richer at American expense. This leads to the
statement that the United States is bearing a disproportionate
share of the burden of its alliance system, which prompts
debates on the subject.
The purpose of this thesis is to study two prominent
concepts for explaining alliances, balance of power and the
12 Russett, op. cit . , p. 93
12

theory of collective goods, to determine if they provide the
quantitative analysis necessary to replace the subjectivity
in the debates with a more precise logic.
13

II. ALLIANCES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
International politics is the set of human activities in
which more or less unequal nation-states, alone or in combina-
tions , compete in a setting of coercion to gain advantage or
avoid disadvantage in the protection or advancement of their
13
national interests. Integral parts of international
politics are the combinations of nations, alliances.
Alliances are distinguished from other international relations
by three factors. They are: (1) existence and identification
of an enemy; (2) contemplation of military engagement; (3)
mutuality of interest in either the preservation of the status
quo or the aggrandizement of their positions. Hence,
alliances are a separate area of concern in the realm of
international politics.
Alliances, as used herein, are relationships between
two or more nation-states which include: (1) a pairing or
collaboration with one another for a limited duration regard-
ing a mutually perceived problem; (2) an aggregation of their
capabilities for participation in international affairs;
(3) the pursuit of national interests jointly or by parallel
courses of action; (4) the probability that assistance will
13 Friedman, Julien R. , Bladen, Christopher, and Rosen,
Steven, Alliance in International Politics
, p. 7, Allyn and





15be rendered by members to one another.
As indicated previously, a distinct characteristic of
alliances is the existence of a mutual enemy or enemies.
Clearly then, no one country could enter or rely on an
alliance for security without full appreciation of the fact
that such action could lead to war. In fact, alliances
are sometimes credited with causing the outbreak of war or
of precipitating a larger scale of involvement than would
otherwise occur. The chain of events that initiated World
War I is a standard example. Following that war, liberals
were quick to point out that military alliances were a
primary cause of war in general, and the replacement of
countervailing alliances (and their corollary arms races)
with a league of nations and disarmament would eliminate war.
This concept was known as collective security. In principle,
it meant an alliance in which an attack against one member
is considered as an attack against all members. The idea
being that such an alliance would always deter any aggressor.
It was supposed to work automatically and call all members
17
against the aggressor immediately. This concept became
manifest in the form of the League of Nations and was to
have prevented the need for alliances and counter-alliances.
15 Ibid
. , p. 4-5.
16 Ibid., P. 14.
17 Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, the Struggle
for Power and Peace





Nevertheless, the period between World War I and World War II
was marked by alliances among France/ Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia, Romania, and the Soviet Union and a counter-
1
8
alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The concept of
collective security failed to work and impeded the defensive
nations from concerting their military power early enough to
19
oppose and deter the expansion of Hitler's Germany. This
shows that alliances are not always good or bad but are pro-
ducts of the working logic of the international political
20
system which alternates between war and peace. They have
maintained peace as well as contributed to the conditions
leading to war.
There is another aspect of alliances that must be ad-
dressed. That is the meaning of the word commitment and
what constitutes a commitment in relation to United States
foreign policy and the language of the treaties. A commitment
is any relationship that has the propensity to bind this
21
country to military action in the future. As such, alli-
ances are not the only relationships considered. Statements
by the President, ambassadors, or high ranking military
18 Ibid. , P. 192-193.
19 Osgood, Robert E. and Tucker, Robert W. , Force, Order
and Justice
, p. 88, Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.
20 Friedman, op. cit
. , p. 93.
21
Paul, Roland A., American Military Commitments Abroad
,
p. 18, Rutgers University Press, 1973.
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officers, establishing a military base on foreign soil, and
dispatch of military advisors to aid in suppressing an in-
surgency are all factors which may require future military
action. None of the treaties in which the United States
is involved specifies what type or how many forces the United
States must provide for the "common defense". The choice of
weapons and amount of effort are left to the individual
22
members of the alliance to decide for themselves. Clearly,
a greater degree of commitment is realized in those places
where large numbers of its armed forces are present. Their
presence establishes a line beyond which adversaries of the
United States and its allies may not advance without becoming
23
engaged in large-scale military operations. In other types
of relationships the degree to which the United States honors
its commitments will depend on how consistent such action
24
would be with American interests at the time. A commitment
made at the signing of the treaty may no longer coincide with
American policy and may be honored reservedly, as President
Nixon has stated. Likewise, when a commitment is honored, it
is often obscured by the fact that such action coincides with
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III. BALANCE OF POWER
A balance of power is both the objective (intent) and
result (perhaps unintended) of a set of coalitions among
nations. The term has a long history which is, unfortunately,
quite ambiguous, because it has been used to describe both
the intent and the accomplishments of alliances. This chapter
will address the usage of the term through history and will
show that it is inapplicable to quantitative analysis.
From the days of Polybius , 175 BC, historical writings
have shown that balance of power was used as a protective
device by an alliance of nations against another nation's
26designs for world domination. The concept of balance of
power was most prevalent in Europe from the sixteenth century
to the end of World War II. During this period, Great
Britain acted as the "balancer" by aligning with the weaker
nations to fight against Spain, France, Russia, Germany, and
others. All this was done to preserve a rough parity among
27the various coalitions of the states of Europe. Little
effort has been made, however, to show why these particular
coalitions were formed, or what each country contributed to
the alliance. All that is said is that coalitions were formed
because of balance of power.
26
Morgenthau, op. cit
. , p. 187.
27 Ibid., p. 196.
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The development of balance of power as a world-wide
system was consummated in the First World War in which prac-
tically all nations of the world participated actively on one
28
side of the other because of alliances or counter-alliances.
Since the end of World War II, the Western Alliance and Western
rearmament have pursued the objective of containing the Soviet
Union and Communism through the creation of a new world balance
of power. The distribution of power in Europe is only one of
the concrete issues over which the power contest between the
29United States and the Soviet Union is being waged. There
was the assumption by these two major powers that no Third
World nation could remain unaligned. As a result, there was
great competition in the form of foreign aid and military
assistance to win their favor.
A nation need not enter into an alliance merely to accom-
modate its balance of power policy. Hans Morgenthau states at
least three other ways that a balance of power may be obtained
or maintained. A country may:
1) Keep its competitors weak by dividing them or keeping
them divided;
2) add to the strength of weaker nations or reduce the
strength of stronger nations by territorial compensation; or
3) increase its quantity or quality of armament.
90





30 Ibid. P. 178-181.
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However, all of these may take more time or resources to
accomplish than are available. Hence, a nation may pursue a
policy of alliances as a matter of expediency, without con-
31
sidering the future costs of such a policy. Nations will
shun alliances when their interests and those of other
countries so obviously call for concerted policies and actions
that explicit formulation of these interests in the form of
an alliance appears to be redundant. They will also shun
alliances if they believe themselves strong enough to hold
their own unaided, or if the commitments resulting from the
32
alliance outweigh the advantages to be gained.
What, then, prompted the United States to form the alli-
ances it did in the immediate post-World War II period? In
view of the preceding discussion and the powerful position
of the United States in the years 1947 to 1954, the apparent
answer is expediency. At that time, a formal system of alli-
ances was the most expeditious means of delineating that
territory which the United States wished to secure from
communist aggression. The alliances certainly did little to
augment American power at that time. However, if in the ab-
sence of an alliance, these countries would not or could not
spend sufficient funds to protect themselves, then it would
benefit the United States in the long run to bring those
countries under its protective umbrella, if the costs of such
31 Ibid






an action were less than the costs incurred should those
33
countries come under communist control.
Whether American foreign policy-makers formed the alli-
ances after giving consideration to the costs of such action
is not known. They may have formed the alliances merely to
withhold the power of these nations from their adversary,
the Soviet Union and communism. For whatever reasons, the
preceding argument serves to introduce the aspect of
economics in relation to the subject of balance of power.
Economics was applied to alliances historically as an aid in
measuring power, or the ability to make war. Today, its
value lies in the concept of public or collective goods.
In its historical role, economics was used to aid in
the measure of power. Poland in the eighteenth century was
divided equally by Russia, Prussia, and Austria in terms of
the fertility of the soil and the number and quality of the
population. A simple division according to acres or numbers
would not suffice. The parties involved had placed values
on the fertility of the soil and the quality of the population.
The same situation existed in Africa during the latter part of
the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth.
The European colonial powers constructed numerous treaties
among themselves delineating spheres of influence. Consideration
was given to the economic gains that could be made by a country
33 Russett, op. cit.
, p. 124.
34 Morgenthau, op. cit
. , p. 179
21

in the areas assigned to it, and care was taken to ensure that
35
the distribution of power remained unchanged.
The application of economics to alliances today is in the
area of collective goods or external economics. As an
example, whenever two or more nations have a common enemy,
and one of those nations does something to weaken the common
enemy, there will be produced a collective good, namely, a
3 ft
weaker enemy, from which all other nations will benefit.
The actions of the one country produced a collective good.
When all nations sharing this common enemy perform similar
actions, then each provides a collective good for all others.
The problem, then, is that these countries, by only viewing
their own position relative to the enemy, spend more for
defense than they would if they combined their efforts in the
form of an alliance. This concept is discussed by Mancur
Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser in their economic theory of
alliance (See Chapter IV)
.
Both the historical and present use of the concept of
balance of power fail to address specifically what is being
balanced. The term power remains undefined. It is a per-
ceptual item having meaning only to the user and has quantity
only in a relative sense. That is, the user, the current
head-of-state or foreign policy-maker, sees the power of one
Ibid .
3 6
McKean, Roland N. , Issues in Defense Economics
,
p. 27,
Columbia University Press, 1967.
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country as being greater or lesser than that of another. He
can thus establish an ordinal ranking but cannot quantify the
power differential between the two. Another head-of-state may
perceive a different power distribution and arrive at a
different ranking. Any distribution of power is highly tenuous
By way of example, there is a current argument that can be
cited. President Nixon and Secretary of State-elect Kissinger
perceive the world as having five poles, the United States,
Europe, Soviet Union, China, and Japan, in an even balance of
power. Zbigniew Brzezinski, a foreign policy analyst, views
the world as having 2V2 + y + z poles. The United States and
the Soviet Union represent two poles because they hold both
military and economic power. China is represented as /z. a pole
because it holds only military power. Europe and Japan are
the unknown quantities because they hold only economic power
37
with no clear political purpose. Obviously, the two views
are not based on the same perception of power, and yet both
parties are in the same country. Adding more countries' views
can only further cloud the issue.
A model that merely describes what has previously happened
is of little value. To be truly useful, it should have some
predictive ability. The balance of power concept has been
used exclusively for the purpose of describing why alliances
were formed. It does not provide insight to the question of
what alliances will form. Further, it does not give any
37 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "The Balance of Power Delusion",
Foreign Policy
, v. 7, p. 54-56, Summer, 1972.
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information on how nations in an alliance are to function or
bear the burden of defense. Finally, the very subjective




IV. AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF ALLIANCES
This chapter addresses the model derived by Mancur Olson,
Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser. This model is an application of
the theory of public or collective goods to alliances and
other small groups. It will be shown that the model quantita-
tively answers the questions on burden-sharing in alliances,
but the assumptions on which it is based limit its applicability
Since this model addresses the subject of collective goods,
some discussion on that topic is necessary. Collective goods
are characterized by having two distinct properties, non-
exclusiveness and nonrivalness. Nonexclusiveness means that
benefits are made available to all members of the group.
That is, it is not feasible to exclude nonpurchasers from the
benefits accrued by the group. Nonrivalness means that each
individual's consumption leads to no subtraction from the
3 8
supply available to others.
Deterrence, on a national level, is clearly a public good.
An attack by a foreign power on any state in the United States
will meet with as strong a reaction as a similar attack on
any other state, an example of nonexclusiveness. Similarly,
the cost of providing deterrence against attack for
Pennsylvania does not increase the cost once it is provided
39for the rest of the country, an example of nonrivalness.
38 Russett, op. cit




Olson and Zeckhauser assume that these principles apply to
military alliances in much the same manner. Thus, by assuming
that deterrence, a benefit of a military alliance, meets the
properties of a collective good, they are able to apply that
theory to the subject of alliances.
This is a very strong assumption, because deterrence in a
military alliance, as opposed to the situation on the national
40level, may not possess the property of nonexclusiveness . In
NATO, for example, the amount of deterrence against attack on
Europe provided by the United States is not necessarily the
same as the amount provided for itself. Also, the amount of
deterrence provided for each ally may not be the same. Canada
and Turkey, although both members of NATO and entitled to
equal amounts of deterrence, may not receive equality due to
geographical differences if nothing else. Further, deterrence
is not the only good produced by a military alliance. An
alliance also provides defense, or a damage-limiting capability,
41
should deterrence fail, and defense is not a collective good.
The means of defense may not provide security equally to all
members of the alliance. Therefore, some members may be ex-
cluded from the benefits of defense, and each ally will surely
42place a higher priority on its own defense than on any other's.
40 McKean, op. cit
. , p. 61.
41 Russett, op. cit
. , p. 97.




The benefits of a military alliance may not necessarily
be collective goods. Arguments can be made both pro and con.
Olson and Zeckhauser make the assumption that, in peacetime,
alliances produce deterrence which is a collective good.
Without this assumption, the theory of collective goods is
inapplicable. For the purpose of this study, this assumption
is considered valid.
The authors make three other assumptions which are also
of questionable validity. However, they stress the point
that these are simplifying assumptions without which the
analysis would become quite cumbersome. These assumptions
are:
1) The costs of defense are constant to scale and the
same for all members;
2) military forces in an alliance provide only the
collective benefit of alliance security; and
3) no alliance member will take into account the re-
actions other members may have to the size of their alliance
contribution.
A brief discussion of each of these is necessary to high-
light the potential weaknesses of their model.
The authors realized that their first assumption was
weak. Clearly, the nations may not value all alliance forces
and equipment the same. Smaller, less industrialized nations
may place higher value on sophisticated equipment than larger
nations because of the costs incurred in other sectors of




their economy as a result of developing such equipment.
Similarly, the smaller nations with lower per capita income
than larger nations may have less difficulty in recruiting
manpower. Olson and Zeckhauser believed these effects to be
negligible, so they assumed that costs of defense were
constant to scale and the same for all members.
Their second assumption is of questionable validity.
An increase in military forces by an alliance member for
purely national purposes, the United States in Vietnam, for
example, provides an additional benefit for all alliance
members. Likewise, an increase in military forces as a
contribution to the alliance by a nation gives that nation
additional capabilities for internal security as well.
Certainly, military forces in an alliance do not provide
only the collective benefit of alliance security.
The third assumption, that no alliance member will take
into account the reactions other members may have to the size
of their alliance contribution, is a subject of concern in
itself. Olson and Zeckhauser contend that the advantage in
any bargaining about relative contributions to the alliance
rests with the smaller nation for two reasons. First, the
large country loses more from withholding an alliance con-
tribution than a small country does, since it values a given
amount of alliance force more highly. That is, it may be
deterred by the very importance to itself of its own contribu-






Secondly, the contribution of the smaller nation will be
small. Hence, the larger country has less to gain that its
45
smaller ally from driving a hard bargain.
Although exceptions and arguments can be made for and
against these assumptions, they are, as the authors elucidate,
for the purpose of simplification. They are considered valid
for the purpose of this study.
Before addressing the model itself, there is one more sub-
ject that must be discussed. This is the subject of inferior,
normal, and superior goods. When an increase in real income
results in an increase in consumption of a good and a decrease
in real income results in a decrease in comsumption of a good,
46then that good is called a normal good. Not all goods are
normal, however. When real income increases and at the same
relative prices, consumption of a good decreases or real in-
come decreases and consumption of a good increases, that good
47is called inferior. When real income increases and all of
the increase in income is used to purchase a good, then it
as
is termed a superior good. " The authors consider deterrence
to be a normal good, but mention special cases that occur
when it is an inferior or a superior good. Hopefully, these
45 Ibid .
46 Mansfield, Edwin, Microeconomics: Theory and Applications ,
p. 65, W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1970.
47 Ibid
-
48 Friedman, op. cit
. , p. 183.
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definitions will aid in clarifying those special cases
discussed by the authors in their model.
The model derived by Olson and Zeckhauser is quoted in
its entirety in Appendix B. For a more precise understanding
of the remainder of this chapter, it is suggested that the
reader peruse that appendix before reading further.
From their analysis, Olson and Zeckhauser conclude that,
in equilibrium, the defense expenditures of the members of
an alliance are such that the "larger" nations, the ones
that place a higher valuation on the alliance good, will bear
49
a disporportionately large share of the common burden.
This implies that nations in an alliance follow a risk
aversion principle. That is, they have utility functions
that are concave to the origin, and they value deterrence
as a normal good. As their incomes increase, they want to
buy more of the alliance good. This reasoning was stated as
hypotheses with which they tested their model.
The hypotheses tested were:
"H-^ - In an alliance, there v/ill be a significant posi-
tive correlation between the size of a member's national
income and the percentage of its national income spent
on defense. This hypothesis will be tested against:
"Hq - There will not be a significant positive correla-
tion between the variables specified in H. ."50
They use GNP as a measure of the size of a country's
national income and D/GNP (military expenditures as a
percentage of GNP) as an indicator of effort to provide
49 Ibid





defense. GNP is used rather than area, population, or some
other measure, because it is really the implicit variable in
the theory. D/GNP is not f lav/less due to the incomparabilities
of the measure between nations, but the distortions are not so
51great as to prevent its use. The data used was from NATO
for 1964, listed in Table I, and Spearman's rank-order corre-
lation was used to test the hypotheses. Olson and Zeckhauser
found their results to be significant at the .05 level for a
52
one-tailed *t' test and accepted their hypothesis H...
Ypersele and Pryor have also tested the same relationship at
two different points in time (1955 and 1963, and 1956 and
521962, respectively) and found positive correlations.
However, the same test on data in 1970 (Table II) revealed no
significant positive correlation. Similar tests of the hypo-
theses on 1970 data for the Arab League (Table IV) also
revealed no significant positive correlation of GNP to D/GNP.
Yet SEATO (Table III) , the Warsaw Pact (Table V) , and the Rio
Pact (Table VI) all reveal significant positive correlations.
Based on these results, there appears to be insufficient
evidence to accept or reject either hypothesis as stated.
It would be unfair to discredit this model because it
lacks universal application. Obviously, there are many
Russett, op. cit
. , p. 101.
52 Friedman, op. cit
. , p. 190.
53 Russett, op. cit
. , p. 101.
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situations which cannot be included in the model or assumed
away. Members of an alliance may spend more than expected
for several reasons. Some of these reasons are because:
1) They lack confidence in the ability of the large power
to deter attack;
2) they seek private goods, such as internal security or
research and development, from their military spending; and
3) they are coerced by the large power into spending more
54than they would normally.
Military alliances may be formed for different functions.
NATO was organized to deter communist aggression in Europe.
The alliance formed by the Arab states is more for the pur-
pose of making war on Israel. Finally, nations may suddenly
change their utility functions, making defense spending an
inferior good. When this occurs, as Olson and Zeckhauser
point out, there may be more than one equilibrium point, and
all will be unstable.
All of the above discussed reasons, and certainly more,
contribute to conditions under which the model will not hold.
As a result, their hypothesis on burden-sharing will not
always be correct. These factors may explain why data on
some alliances failed to support their conclusions, and
others did.
Their model does not give any information on how the






of the bargaining process involved among the nations, or hov;
the utility functions of these nations must change to make
defense a normal good again. The model deals only with the
situation when the alliance is in equilibrium and their
assumptions are met. There will be periods of time when it
is inapplicable. These periods may be measured in terms of
years, and there is no information given as to how alliances
will operate or the burden shared during these periods.
The Olson and Zeckhauser model provides some quantitative
analysis of alliances, and it gives insight to the question
of burden-sharing. However, it only applies when the alli-
ance is in an equilibrium state and when the assumptions are
met, which may occur quite infrequently. The model has value











United States 569.03 1 9.0 1
Germany 88.87 2 5.5 6
United Kingdom 79.46 3 7.0 3
France 73.40 4 6.7 4
Italy 43.63 5 4.1 10
Canada 38.14 6 4.4 8
Netherlands 15.00 7 4.9 7
Belgium 13.43 8 3.7 12
Denmark 7.73 9 3.3 13
Turkey 6.69 10 5.8 5
Norway 5.64 11 3.9 11
Greece 4.31 12 4.2 9
Portugal 2.88 13 7.7 2
Luxembourg .53 14 1.7 14
Iceland .40 15 — 15
rho = 0.58 6
t = 2.6077
df = 13; one-tailed test; Significant @ 95%
55 Friedman, op. cit











United States 974.1 1 8.0 1
Germany 186.3 2 3.3 7
United Kingdom 121.0 3 4.8 4
Italy 93.2 4 2.7 9
Canada 84.7 5 2.2 11
Netherlands 31.2 6 3.5 6
Belgium 25.7 7 2.7 9
Denmark 15.6 8 2.4 10
Turkey 9.0 11 4.6 5
Norway 13.4 9 3.0 8
Greece 9.5 10 5.0 3
Portugal 6.2 12 7.0 2
Luxembourg 1.0 13 .8 12
Iceland .5 14 — 13
rho = 0.378
t = 1.417
df = 12; one-tailed test; not significant @ 95%








Rank % D/GNP Rank
United States 974.1 1 7.98 1
United Kingdom 121.0 3 4.84 2
France 147.5 2 4.05 3
Australia 32.99 4 4.02 4
Pakistan 17.5 5 3.72 5
New Zealand 5.33 8 1.96 7
Philippines 10.23 6 1.21 8
Thailand 6.51 7 3.60 6
rho = 0.904
t - 5.188











df = 11; one-tailed test; not significant @ 95%
Rank
Egypt 6.58 1 13.9 2
Algeria 4.18 2 2.3 11
Morocco 3.34 3 2.8 9
Iraq 2.69 6 11.0 5
Kuwait 2.75 5 10.8 6
Saudi Arabia 3.14 4 13.3 4
Sudan 1.89 7 6.1 7
Syria 1.59 8 13.8 3
Lebanon 1.52 9 3.4 8
Tunisia 1.22 10 1.8 12
Libya 3.14 4 1.4 13
Jordan .575 12 20.5 1




































rho = 0.8 57
t = 3.72






Country GNP Rank D/GNP Rank
United States 974.1 1 7.98 1
Brazil 35.44 2 2.87 3
Mexico 33.0 3 .67 17
Argentina 23.83 4 2.15 5
Venzuela 10.3 5 1.98 8
Colombia 7.07 6 1.37 14
Chile 6.67 7 2.50 4
Peru 4.80 8 4.08 2
Uruguay 2.14 9 2.05 6
Guatemala 1.78 11 1.62 11
Ecuador 1.80 10 1.44 13
Dominican Republic 1.50 12 2.00 7
El Salvador .997 14 1.10 15
Panama 1.016 13 .19 18




Nicaragua .772 16 1.55 12
Honduras .685 17 1.02 16
Paraguay .600 18 1.83 10
Haiti .360 19 1.94 9










In this paper, two prominent concepts for explaining
alliance formation were considered. These concepts were
balance of power and the theory of collective goods. They
were studied to determine if they could provide some quan-
titative analysis on the subject of burden-sharing in
alliances.
The balance of power philosphy which has persisted for
centuries is far too subjective and does not lend itself to
quantitative analysis. The result is that no precise in-
formation can be gained by its application.
The economic theory of alliances authored by Olson and
Zeckhauser provides information on the much discussed subject
of burden-sharing. However, their major conclusion, a posi-
tive correlation exists between the size of a country's
income and the size of its contribution to the alliance,
occurs only when the alliance is in equilibrium and when
their other assumptions are met. This may occur infrequently,
which limits the applicability of the model.
It is significant to note that at a time when the United
States is undergoing a revision of its foreign policy and
definitive answers are needed on the subject of alliances, no
precise model for quantitative analysis is available. Hopefully,
the subjective analysis that will surely ensue on this subject




















5. Mutual Cooperation and
Security between United
States and Japan











































Vietnam as a protocol
state.
Nationalist China
Total: 42 plus South
Vietnam.
Paul, op. cit
. , p. 14-15




AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF ALLIANCES 63
When a nation decides how large a military force to pro-
vide in an alliance, it must consider the value it places
upon collective defense and the other, non-defense, goods
that must be sacrificed to obtain additional military forces.
The value each nation in an alliance places upon the alliance
collective good vis-a-vis other goods can be shown on a simple
indifference map, such as is shown in Figure 1. This is an
ordinary indifference map cut off at the present income line
and turned upside down. Defense capability is measured along
the horizontal axis and valued positively. Defense spending
is measured along the vertical axis and valued negatively.
The cost curves are assumed to be linear for the sake of
simplicity. If the nation depicted in Figure 1 were not a
part of any alliance, the amount of defense it would obtain
(OB) could be found by drawing a cost curve coming out of the
origin and finding the point (point A) where this cost curve
is tangent to the "highest" (most southeasterly) indifference
curve
.
In an alliance, the amount a nation spends on defense will
be affected by the amount its allies provide. By moving the
cost curve down along the vertical axis beneath the origin we
63 Friedman, op. cit
. , p. 178-184.
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can represent the defense expenditure of allied nations as
the distance between the origin and the juncture of the cost
curve and the vertical axis. If a nation's allies spend OD
on defense, and their cost functions are the same as its own,
then it receives OH of defense without cost. This is directly
equivalent to an increase in income of OD. The more defense
this nation's allies provide, the further the cost constraint
moves to the southeast, and the less it spends on defense. By
recording all the points of tangency of the total cost curve
with the indifference curves, we can obtain this nation's
reaction function. The reaction function indicates how much
defense this nation will produce for all possible levels of
defense expenditure by its allies. The amount of defense that
this nation provides will in turn influence the defense output
of its allies, whose reaction curves can be determined in the
same way.
Figure 2 shows the reaction curves for a two-country
model (which can easily be generalized to cover N countries)
.
The intersection point of the two reaction curves indicates
how much of the alliance good each ally will supply in
equilibrium. The two reaction curves need not always
intersect. If one nation has a very much larger demand
for the alliance good than the other , its reaction curve may
lie at every point outside that of the other, in which case
it will provide all of the defense. The equilibrium output
will then be the same as the isolation output of the country
with the largest isolation output. Whether the reaction curves
intersect or not, the equilibrium output is necessarily
44

determinate and stable unless defense is an inferior good, in
which case there may be a number of equilibria, one or more of
which may be unstable.
In equilibrium, the defense expenditures of the two nations
are such that the "larger" nation - the one that places the
higher absolute value on the alliance good - will bear a
disproportionately large share of the common burden. It will
pay a share of the costs that is larger than its share of the
benefits, and thus the distribution of costs will be quite
different from that which a system of benefit taxation would
bring about. This becomes obvious when income ef fects - i .e.
,
the influence that the amount of non-defense goods a nation has
already forgone has on its desire to provide additional units
of defense - are neglected. This is shown in Figure 3, which
depicts the evaluation curves of two nations for alliance
forces. The larger nation, called Big Atlantis, has the
higher, steeper valuation curve, V_ , because it places a
a
higher absolute value on defense than Little Atlantis, which
has evaluation curve V_ . The CC curve shows the costs of pro-
viding defense capability to each nation, since both, by
assumption, have the same costs. In isolation, Big Atlantis
would buy B, units of defense and Little Atlantis 1, , for at
these points their respective valuation curves are parallel
to their cost functions. If the two nations continued to
provide these outputs in alliance each would enjoy B. plus L,
units of defense. But then each nation values a marginal unit
at less than its marginal cost. Big Atlantis will stop re-
ducing its output of deterrence when the sum applied by the
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two nations together is B.. . When this amount (or any amount
greater than L. ) is available, it is not in Little Atlantis'
interest to supply any defense whatever. The two nations are
therefore simultaneously in equilibrium only when Big Atlantis
provides B. of defense and Little Atlantis provides no defense
whatever.
The disproportionality in the sharing of burdens is less
extreme when income effects are taken into account, but it is
still important. This can be seen most easily by supposing that
Big Atlantis and Little Atlantis are identical in every respect
save that Big Atlantis is twice the size of Little Atlantis.
Per capita incomes and individual tastes are the same in both
countries, but the population and GNP of Big Atlantis are
twice that of Little Atlantis. Now imagine also that Big
Atlantis is providing twice as much alliance defense as Little
Atlantis, as proportionality would require. In equilibrium,
the marginal rate of substitution of money for the alliance
good (MRS) must equal marginal cost for each of these countries,
i.e., MRS_. = MRS-.... = marginal cost. But (since each
country enjoys the same amount of the collective good) the
MRS of Big Atlantis is double that of Little Atlantis, and
(since the cost of an additional unit of defense is the same
for each country) either Big Atlantis will want more defense
or Little Atlantis will want less (or both will be true) , and
the common burden will come to be shared in a disproportionate
way.
There is one important special case in which there will
be no tendency toward disproportionality. That is when the
46

indifference maps of the member nations are such that any
perpendicular from the ordinate would intersect all in-
difference curves at points of equal slope. In this case,
when the nation's cost constraint moves to the right as it
gets more free defense, it would not reduce its own expendi-
ture on defense. In other words, none of the increase in
income that the nation receives in the form of defense is
spent on goods other than defense. Defense in this situation
is, strictly speaking, a "superior good", a good such that
all of any increase in income is used to buy the good.
This special case may sometimes be very important.
During periods of all-out war or exceptional insecurity, it
is likely that defense is (or is nearly) a superior good, and
in such circumstances alliances will not have any tendency
toward disproportionate burden sharing. The amount of allied
military capability that Great Britain enjoyed in World War
II increased from 1941 to 1944 as the United States mobilized,
adding more and more strength to the allied side. But the














FIGURE 2. Reaction Curves
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